(2008) Gabriel Vacariu, Epistemologically Different Worlds, University of Bucharest Press
Preface………………………………………………………………………………………… 7
Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………. 13
Part I. The “epistemologically different worlds”
perspective and its background
Chapter 1. The Cartesian framework for the mind-body problem .. 25
1.1. The Cartesian “I” ……………………………………………………………….. 26
1.2. Clear, distinct and complete perceptions ……………………………….. 28
1.3. The two substances and the bi-directional relationship between
“epistemology” and “ontology” ………………………………………….. 32
1.3.1. The epistemological argument ……………………………………. 32
1.3.2. Complete things/knowledge ……………………………………….. 35
1.3.3. The relationship between ontology and epistemology …… 36
1.4. One world and the relationships between all primitives (the union
between mind and body, the “I” and the “world”, etc.) …………… 39
Chapter 2. Kant’s anti-metaphysics, empirical knowledge and
objective reality ……………………………………………………………………… 48
2.1. Transcendental deduction ……………………………………………………. 55
2.2. The role of original synthetic unity of apperception for internal
and external objects ……………………………………………………………. 66
2.3. The schematism …………………………………………………………………. 69
2.4. Apperception and existence …………………………………………………. 85
2.5. Apperception and the noumenal self …………………………………….. 94
2.6. Against Kant’s perspective ………………………………………………….. 98
Chapter 3. The epistemological different worlds perspective ……….. 101
3.1. Epistemologically different worlds ………………………………………. 101
3.2. The role of the conditions of observation in the defining of
physical and mental phenomena ………………………………………….. 113
3.2.1. The influence of Kant on Bohr’s approach …………………… 114
Gabriel Vacariu
386
3.2.2. The principle of conceptual containment ……………………… 116
3.3.3. The physical human subject or the “I” …………………………. 119
3.4. The hyperverse and its EDWs – the antimetaphysical
foundation of the EDWs perspective ……………………………………. 150
Part II. Applications
Chapter 4. Applications to some notions from philosophy of mind .. 159
4.1. Levels and reduction vs. emergence ……………………………………… 160
4.2. Qualia, Kant and the “I” ……………………………………………………… 181
4.3. Mental causation and supervenience …………………………………….. 190
Chapter 5. Applications to some notions from cognitive science …… 200
5.1. Computationalism ……………………………………………………………… 200
5.2. Connectionism …………………………………………………………………… 211
5.3. The dynamical system approach ………………………………………….. 223
5.4. Robotics ……………………………………………………………………………. 232
5.5. Dichotomies concerning the notion of mental representation
and processing …………………………………………………………………… 243
5.6. The EDWs perspective and some key elements in cognitive
science ……………………………………………………………………………… 249
5.7. The relation between key elements and some philosophical
distinctions ……………………………………………………………………….. 264
5.8. Cognitive neuroscience ………………………………………………………. 267
5.9. The status of any living entity ……………………………………………… 277
Chapter 6. Applications to some notions from philosophy of
science and science …………………………………………………………………. 281
6.1. A glance at logical positivism ……………………………………………… 285
6.2. Carnap’s linguistic frameworks ……………………………………………. 289
6.3. Carnap vs. Gödel or syntactic vs. semantic ……………………………. 292
6.4. Carnap vs. Quine or rational reconstruction vs. naturalized
epistemology …………………………………………………………………….. 295
6.5. Quine’s ontological relativity ………………………………………………. 296
6.6. Goodman’s relativity ………………………………………………………….. 298
6.7. Putnam and the rejection of the “thing-in-itself” …………………….. 299
6.8. Friedman’s relative constitutive a priori principles………………….. 301
6.9. Some notions from quantum mechanics ………………………………… 305
6.10. The status of the external non-living epistemologically different
entities …………………………………………………………………………… 343
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………. 361
References ………………………………………………………………………
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