Being and the Hyperverse – An axiomatic-hyperontological framework for epistemologically different worlds

(2011) Gabriel Vacariu, Being and the Hyperverse – An axiomatic-hyperontological framework for epistemologically different worlds, University of Bucharest Press

Part 1. The „Unicorn-World”, the House of Knowledge – the Human Greatest Illusion ……………………………………………………… 13

Part 2. Definitions …………………………………………………………………………… 27

Part 3. Propositions for its ……………………………………………………………….. 33

Part 4. Space, Time and Hypernothing …………………………………………… 43

Part 5. Propositions for Its and Being ……………………………………………… 53

Part 6. Subjectivity, Knowledge and Being ……………………………………. 69

Part 7. Cell, Life and EDWs …………………………………………………………… 79

Part 8. Some Actual Alternatives of the Mind-Body Problem from Cognitive Neuroscience and the EDWs Perspective …………… 89

Part 9. The Hyperverse …………………………………………………………………… 121

Part 10. Representations and Being ………………………………………………….. 139

Part 11. Knowledge and Being …………………………………………………………. 151

Part 12. Optimism Versus Skepticism in Explaining Mind through the Brain Imaging ………………………………………………………………… 163

Part 13. “The Unicorn-World Is Dead. Long Live the Hyperverse!” ….. 173

Reference ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 177

References

ANDERSON, P. W., 1972, “More is Different”, American Association for the Advancement of Science 177, pp. 393-396.

BAARS, J. BENJAMIN and FRANKLIN, S., 2007, “An Architectural Model of Conscious and Unconscious Brain Functions: Global Workspace Theory and IDA”, Neural Networks 20, pp. 955-961.

BAARS, J. BERNARD, 1988, A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press.

BLOCK, NED, 2003, “Do Causal Powers Drain Away?”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 110-127.

BECHTEL, WILLIAM (in press), “Referring to Localized Cognitive Operations in Parts of Dynamically Active Brains”, in A. Raftopoulos and P. Machamer (eds.), Perception, Realism and the Problem of Reference, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BECHTEL, WILLIAM, 2009, “Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity, and Situated Cognition”, in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BECHTEL, WILLIAM, 2008, Mental Mechanisms, Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

BECHTEL, 2002, “Decomposing the Mind-Brain: A Long-Term Pursuit”, BRAIN AND MIND 3: 229-242.

BECHTEL, WILLIAM & ABRAHAMSEN, ADELE, 2002, Connectionism And The Mind: Parallel Processing, Dynamics, And Evolution In Networks, second edition, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

BECHTEL, WILLIAM, 2001, “The Compatibility of Complex Systems and Reduction: A Case Analysis of Memory Research”, Minds and Machines 11: 483-502.

BICKLE, JOHN, 2008, “Real Reductionism in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and Certainly Not Metaphysics!)”, in J. Hohwy and J. Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 34-51.

BICKLE, JOHN, 2007, “The Philosophy of Neuroscience”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

BICKLE, JOHN, 2007, “Who Says You Can’t Do a Molecular Biology of Consciousness?”, in Maurice Schouten and Huib Looren de Jong (eds.), The Matter of the Mind Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience, and Reduction, Blackwell Publishing.

BICKLE, JOHN, 2003, “Philosophy of Mind and the Neuroscience”, in Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, pp. 322-351.

CARNAP, RUDOLF, 1950, “Empiricism, semantics, and ontology” reprinted from review International du Philosophie, iv (1950), pp. 20-40 in Richard M. Rorty (ed.), The Linguist Turn, The University of Chicago Press, 1967.

CHURCHLAND, M. PAUL, 1995, The Engine of the Reason, the Seat of the Soul, A Broadford Book, The MIT Press.

CLARK, ANDY, 1993, Associative Engines Connectionism, Concepts, and Representational Change, A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.

CLARK, ANDY, 1997c, “From Text to Process – Connectionism’s Contribution to the Future of Cognitive Science”, in David Martel Johnson and Cristina E. Erling, The Future of Cognitive Revolution, Oxford University Press.

CLARK, ANDY, 2001, Mindware – An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science, New York, Oxoford, Oxford University Press.

DAVIDSON, DONALD, 1970, “Mental Events”, in Davidson Donald, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press.

DAMASIO, R. ANTONIO, 1988, “Time-Locked Multiregional Retroactivation: A System Proposal for the Neural Substrates of Recall and Recognition”, Cognition, no. 33, pp. 25-62.

DYSON, J. FREEMAN, 2004, “Thought-Experiments in Honour of John Archibald Wheeler”, in D. John Barrow, C. W. Paul Davies, L. Charles Harper, 2004, Science and Ultimate Reality: Quantum Theory, Cosmology and Complexity, Cambridge University Press.

FRIEDMAN, MICHAEL, 1992, Kant and Exact Sciences, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. FRIEDMAN, MICHAEL, 2001, Dynamics of Reasoning, CSLI Publications, Standford, California. FRITH, CHRIS (2007), How the Brain Creates our Mental World, Blackwell Publishing. FODOR, A. JERRY & PYLYSHYN, W. ZENON, 1988, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”, Cognition 28, pp. 3-71.

GILL, VICTORIA, 2010 (14 July), Plants “Can Think and Remember”, BIG BANG news (14 July 2010). GRUSH, R., 2004, “The Emulation Theory of Representation: Motor Control, Imagery, and percepTion,” Brain and Behavioral Science 27, pp. 77-442.

HANNA, ROBERT, 2001, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.

HARDCASTLE, VALERIE GRAY and STEWART, C. MATTHEW, 2002, “What Do Brain Data Really Show?”, Philosophy of Science 69, pp. S72-S82. KAISER, DAVID, 1992, “More Roots of Complementarity: Kantian Aspects and Influences”, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 213-239.

KANT, IMMANUEL, 1958, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith, New York, Modern Library. KAUFFMAN, STUART, 1995, At Home in the Universe, New York, Oxford University Press.

KAZAN CASEY (via MIT Technology Review) (February 01, 2011), “Epic Discovery: Our Colossal Universe – 250 Times Bigger than What We See”, The Daily Galaxy. KIM, JAEGWON, 1998, Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, MA,MIT Press.

KIM, JAEGWON, 2005, Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press.

KOSSLYN, S. MICHAEL, 1997, “Mental Imagery”, in Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), Kosslyn, S. Michael; and SMITH, E. EDUARD, 2001, “Higher Cognitive Functions – Introduction”, in Michael S. Gazzaniga, (ed.), Cognitive Neuroscience, second edition, MIT Press.

KOSSLYN, S. MICHAEL and KEONIG, O., 1992, Wet Mind- the New Cognitive Neuroscience, The Free Press.

LLINAS, R. RODOLFO, 2001, I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self, The MIT Press.

LLINAS, R. RODOLFO and PARE, D., 1996, “The Brain As a Closed System Modulated By the Senses”, in Patricia S. Churchland and Rodolfo Llinas (eds.), The Mind-Brain Continuum: Sensory Processes, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

LORENZ, KONRAD, 1941, “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology”, in H. Plotkin (ed.) Learning, Development and Culture, Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1982.

LUNGARELLA, MAX and SPORNS, OLAF, 2006, “Mapping Information Flow in Sensorimotor Networks”, Public Library of Science Computational Biology, vol. 2 issue 10, pp. 1301-12.

PICCININI, GUALTIERO, 2006, “Computational Explanation in Neuroscience”, Synthese.

PIPPIN, B. ROBERT, 1997, Idealism As Modernism – Hegelian Variations, Cambridge University Press. PARVU, ILIE, 2004, Posibilitatea Experientei, (in English The Possibility of Experience), Politeia-SNSPA . PRINZ, J. JESSE, 2006, “Is the Mind Really Modular” in Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell Publishing.

PUTNAM, HILLARY, 2005, “A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)”, British Journal of Philosophy of Science 56, pp. 615-634.

PYLYSHYN, ZENON, 2003, “Return of the Mental Image: Are There Really Pictures in the Brain?”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 7, no. 3.

PYLYSHYN, ZENON, 1999, “Is Vision Continuous With Cognition? The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception”, Behavioral and Brain Science, 22(3):341-65. QUINE, V. O. WILLARD, 1968, “Ontological Relativity”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXV, no. 7, in Quine, W. V. in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

RAICHLE, E. MARCHUS, 2006, “The Brain’s Dark Energy”, Neuroscience vol. 314, pp. 1249-1250. RAMACHANDRAN, S. VILAYANUR and SANDRA BLAKESLEE, 1998, Phantoms in the Brain, William Morrow and Company Inc., New York.

RAMACHANDRAN, S. VILAYANUR, 2003, “Synapses and the Brain”, at www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/lecture2.shtml SEARLE, R. JOHN, 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind, MIT Press.

SEARLE, R. JOHN, 1995, “Consciousness, the Brain and the Connection Principle: A Reply”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55. pp. 217-232.

SEARLE, R. JOHN, 1999, “The Chinese Room”, in Wilson, R. A. and F. Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MIT Press.

SMOLENSKY, P., 1988, “On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism”, Brain and Behavioral Science 11, pp. 1-74.

SMOLIN, LEE, 2006, “A Crisis in Fundamental Physics”, The New York Academy of Sciences, Jan/Feb issue.

SPORNS, OLAF, 2006,“Good Information? It’s Not All About the Brain”, November 2006, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/10/061027081145.htm

TELLER, PAUL, 2004, “How We Dapple the World”, Philosophy of Science 71 (2004) pp. 425-447. TOADER, IULIAN and VACARIU, GABRIEL (1999), “Inquires on Carnap’s Aufbau (II)”, Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, no. 42-43, Romanian Academy.

TOADER, IULIAN and VACARIU, GABRIEL (1997), “Inquires on Carnap’s Aufbau (I)”, Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, no. 3-4, Romanian Academy.

UTTAL, W. (in press), Mind and Brain: A Critical Appraisal of Cognitive Neuroscience, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.

UTTAL, W., 2002, “Response to Bechtel and Lloyd”, in Brain and Mind 3: 261-273.

VACARIU, GABRIEL, 2008, Epistemologically Different Worlds, (in English) University of Bucharest Press (at http://www.ubphilosophy.ro/gvacariu)

VACARIU, GABRIEL and TOADER, IULIAN (1998), “Color Similarity in Carnap’s Aufbau ”, Krisis, vol. 6.

VACARIU, GABRIEL, 2005, “Mind, Brain and Epistemologically Different Worlds”, in Synthese Review, vol. 143, no. 3.

VACARIU and VACARIU, 2010, Mind, Life and Matter in the Hyperverse, (in English) University of Bucharest Press (at http://www.ubphilosophy.ro/gvacariu)

VUL, E., C. HARRIS, WINKIELMAN, P. and PASHLER, H., 2008, “Voodoo Correlations in Social Neuroscience”, in Press, Perspectives on Psychological Science, at http://www.edvul.com/pdf/Vul_etal_2008inpress.pdf

WAXMAN, W., 1995, “Kant on the Possibility of Thought: Universals without Language”, Review of Metaphysics, 48:4, pp. 809-57.

WHEELER, MICHAEL, 2005, Reconstructing the Cognitive World – The Next Step, Bradford Book, The MIT Press.

WHEELER, MICHAEL, 2009, “The Problem of Representation”, in Shaun Gallager and Daniel Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Springer.